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A Tale of Two Jurisdictions
Alan M. Trammell*
The Supreme Court has recently clarified one corner of personal
jurisdiction—a court’s power to hale a defendant into court—and pointed the
way toward a coherent theory of the rest of the doctrine. For nearly seventy years,
the Court has embraced two theories of when jurisdiction over a defendant is
permissible. The traditional theory, general jurisdiction, authorizes jurisdiction
when there is a tight connection between the defendant and the forum. The
modern theory, specific jurisdiction, focuses more on the connection between the
lawsuit itself and the forum. Although the two theories should have developed
in tandem, the doctrine has become a morass.
This Article makes three contributions. First, it elucidates the unsettling
disjunction that has developed between general and specific jurisdiction.
Second, from a doctrinal perspective, it demonstrates that the Court has
severely constrained the reach of general jurisdiction in a way that would have
been surprising just four years ago. In all likelihood, a corporation is subject to
general jurisdiction only in its state of incorporation and where it maintains its
principal place of business. This doctrinal development sensibly has restricted
general jurisdiction to what I call the saturation point—the place (or very
limited number of places) where a defendant cannot have more significant
contacts anywhere else. Third, it posits that the concept of a saturation point for
general jurisdiction logically suggests a saturation point for specific
jurisdiction—that is, a place where the lawsuit itself could not have more
significant ties to any other forum. The latter saturation point winds up being
more of a thought experiment, but one that bookends a coherent vision of the
entire doctrine. The constitutional test for the exercise of jurisdiction at either
saturation point is exceedingly demanding, but personal jurisdiction can exist
along a continuum. Between the two saturation points, when a particular forum
has some connection to both the defendant and also the lawsuit, the
constitutional test is quite lax. In other words, the notion of saturation points
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and the continuum between them can sensibly integrate the two forms of
personal jurisdiction, which until now have had an uneasy relationship.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For those of us who are strangely enamored of the nuances of
personal jurisdiction, the last four years have been the best of times and
the worst of times, an age of wisdom and an age of foolishness. 1 On the
one hand, the Supreme Court has clarified general jurisdiction, which
gives a court power over a defendant in any lawsuit, even one that has
no connection to the forum. For decades, general jurisdiction had
languished with scant and unsatisfying attention from the Court. But
in 2011 and 2014, the Court spoke with a nearly unanimous voice in
two cases to define that form of personal jurisdiction with remarkable
precision.2 On the other hand, important aspects of specific jurisdiction
remain mired in confusing and fractured jurisprudence. That species of
jurisdiction gives a court power over a defendant when the lawsuit itself
is closely connected to the forum. Despite the promise of greater clarity
in 2011, the Court yet again failed to muster even a majority opinion. 3
1.
See CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO CITIES 3 (Washington Square Press 1973) (1859).
2.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (eight-Justice majority); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011) (unanimous).
3.
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (four-Justice plurality).
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This Article has three goals. First, it demonstrates that general
and specific jurisdiction have had an uneasy relationship from the
beginning and have conspired to generate an illogical and unpredictable
jurisprudence. Second, it shows that the Supreme Court has
significantly reined in general jurisdiction to an extent that would have
been surprising just four years ago. In so doing, it brought theoretical
cohesion to that aspect of personal jurisdiction. Third, this Article
argues that the Court’s recent general jurisdiction case law points
toward a coherent theory of personal jurisdiction, grounded in the
notion that due process protects parties against the arbitrary exercise
of judicial power. In so doing, the latent theory within the recent case
law offers a way to resolve the long-festering disjunction between
general and specific jurisdiction.
Part II elucidates the disjunction. General jurisdiction was
rooted in distinctly territorial notions of judicial power. As people and
businesses became less geographically concentrated, a territorial
approach to jurisdiction often led to bizarre results and, in turn, a series
of legal fictions that attempted to correct the worst injustices. Specific
jurisdiction aspired to scuttle those fictions and create a pragmatic and
flexible basis for jurisdiction. It focused on the reasonableness of
jurisdiction in any given place and, in particular, whether the lawsuit
itself bore an acceptable relationship to the forum. If all had proceeded
according to plan, specific jurisdiction would have become the primary
way to hale defendants into court. But that didn’t happen. The Supreme
Court erected significant barriers to the exercise of specific jurisdiction.
To fill the resulting jurisdictional gaps, lower courts often took
advantage of the Supreme Court’s sparse edicts on general jurisdiction
and pressed that doctrine into service in expansive and unpredictable
ways. But most of those ad hoc developments were untethered to any
sound theory of jurisdiction. Consequently, the two species of personal
jurisdiction have never been truly complementary.
Part III argues that the Supreme Court has tightened the
concept of general jurisdiction to an extent that, until quite recently,
would have been unfathomable. In so doing, the Court provided
theoretical cohesion to this aspect of the jurisdictional calculus. In
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown4 and Daimler AG v.
Bauman,5 the Court made plain that many lower courts’ expansive
approaches to general jurisdiction over corporations were improper.
Instead, a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only where

4.
5.

131 S. Ct. 2846.
134 S. Ct. 746.
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it is “at home,”6 and the paradigm of being at home is when a
corporation has incorporated in a state or maintains its principal place
of business there.7 But could a corporation be at home somewhere else?
It’s possible, suggested the Court, but highly improbable.8 Those
answers represented a sea change in general jurisdiction, and Daimler
signaled that there is almost no play in the joints.
Part IV demonstrates that the near unanimity regarding
general jurisdiction sheds light on how to resolve the Court’s seemingly
insuperable divisions regarding specific jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction are not binary. Instead, they
simply are terms that describe different points along a constitutional
continuum. Within the new general jurisdiction case law lies the germ
of a coherent theory, one that has eluded the Supreme Court for decades
but can offer a unifying vision of personal jurisdiction.
The seminal case of International Shoe Co. v. Washington9
essentially recognized two relationships that exist along different axes
and define the personal jurisdiction continuum—first, the connection
between the defendant and the forum; second, the connection between
the lawsuit and the forum. If my conclusion in Part II is correct, the
Supreme Court has held that when there is no relationship between the
lawsuit and the forum, general jurisdiction is constitutionally
permissible only at what I call the saturation point. What I mean by
this is the place (or limited number of places) where the defendant has
so many contacts that there is no other state or country with which the
defendant has more significant contacts. Restricting general
jurisdiction to the saturation point vindicates a vision of due process
that protects parties against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power.
This idea of a saturation point along one axis—the relationship
between the defendant and the forum—suggests that there is a
saturation point along the other. Courts and scholars have not explicitly
entertained or explored this concept. In theory, though, there is a point
at which the connection between a lawsuit and the forum is so strong
that the assertion of personal jurisdiction is permissible even if the
defendant has no connection to the forum. This saturation point is more
6.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754, 760–62; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, 2854, 2857; see also
Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527,
531–32 (2012) (arguing that Goodyear’s “at home” formulation articulated a necessary, not merely
sufficient, condition for proper exercise of general jurisdiction).
7.
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.
8.
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54; see also PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: THE CURSE OF
THE BLACK PEARL (Walt Disney Pictures/Jerry Bruckheimer Films 2003) (Barbossa, upon seeing
Jack Sparrow alive: “It’s not possible.” / Sparrow: “Not probable.”). But don’t see PIRATES OF THE
CARIBBEAN: ON STRANGER TIDES (Walt Disney Pictures/Jerry Bruckheimer Films 2011).
9.
326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
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theoretical than real. It is conceptually useful, however, because it
identifies the other outer constitutional boundary for personal
jurisdiction. Together, these saturation points suggest a lucid theory of
jurisdiction based on the concept of nonarbitrariness.
Most cases will not implicate the extreme of either saturation
point. They will involve at least some connection between the defendant
and the forum as well as some connection between the lawsuit and the
forum. That vast middle ground is an area in which the
nonarbitrariness principle requires neither relationship to be as strong
as it is at either saturation point. The fallacy committed by a plurality
(and perhaps a majority) of the Supreme Court has involved taking the
stringent standards that govern the extremes and applying them to the
middle. In fact, the constitutional test for personal jurisdiction in this
middle ground is far more forgiving than current jurisprudence
suggests.
Although Goodyear and Daimler brought considerable
theoretical cohesion to general jurisdiction, a practical problem looms.
Under the Court’s current case law, general jurisdiction is now
appropriately narrow, but specific jurisdiction has remained
inappropriately limited. The result is an even larger jurisdictional
lacuna than the one that had developed insidiously over the last several
decades.
The gap need not exist. Because the Constitution imposes
exacting standards at the saturation points, but very few restraints in
most other cases, the theory developed here would work a vast
expansion of specific jurisdiction and significantly alter current
doctrine. But this reconceptualization of the doctrine also reveals a wide
berth for Congress and the Court to craft prudential restraints on
courts’ adjudicative power. In so doing, those institutions can address
subconstitutional concerns about convenience, predictability, and
fairness. This potentially productive dialogue between the legislature
and the judiciary cannot happen, though, until the Supreme Court
finally differentiates between the truly constitutional and the merely
prudential restraints that govern personal jurisdiction.
II. THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN SPECIFIC AND GENERAL JURISDICTION
Until relatively recently, personal jurisdiction was grounded in
territorial theories of judicial power. The centuries-old idea found
expression in the canonical case of Pennoyer v. Neff: “[E]very State

4 - Trammell_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

506

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

3/11/2015 7:19 PM

[Vol. 68:2:501

possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and
property within its territory.”10
As courts began to realize that old theories were not up to the
challenges presented by a less geographically concentrated society, they
developed a modern, pragmatic theory of personal jurisdiction.
Although the pragmatic theory should have done most of the heavy
lifting in fashioning a new approach fit for twentieth-century realities,
its reach became oddly circumscribed. The old and new theories never
meshed as early commentators had hoped, and a long-festering
disjunction has ensued.
A. The Rise and Unfulfilled Promise of Specific Jurisdiction
Major developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries—primarily the growth of corporations and the increased
mobility of individuals—put stress on the formalism of the old
territorial approach to personal jurisdiction.11 As corporations
expanded operations beyond state borders, the likelihood that they
might cause harm outside of their home states increased dramatically.
Courts responded along two different dimensions, even though at the
time they did not conceptualize their responses in that way. In fact, the
jurisprudence initially was something of a hodgepodge.12
One response essentially tried to fit corporations into the old
territorial paradigm. If an individual was amenable to personal
jurisdiction in her domicile, what was the equivalent place for a
corporation? This approach speaks to the central concept underlying
general jurisdiction—discerning where a defendant (whether an
individual or an entity) is amenable to jurisdiction for any lawsuit.
Professor Twitchell aptly termed this form of jurisdiction “disputeblind,” insofar as it is indifferent to any connection between the dispute
itself and the forum. 13 In the process of trying to determine the
corporate equivalent of domicile, courts invoked a number of
metaphors, attempting to suss out where a corporation was “present”
or actually “doing business.”14 As courts grappled with those somewhat

10. 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877).
11. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 620–21
(1988); Stein, supra note 6, at 534. Before then, the formalisms were far less problematic, mainly
because most disputes were localized. See Twitchell, supra, at 615.
12. See James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of
General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 974 (2012).
13. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 613.
14. See id. at 621–22; Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 973.
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metaphysical questions,15 they reached results that often defied
consistency and sound theory.16
The other response to this dilemma was the rise of what has
become known as specific jurisdiction. It was dispute-specific, focusing
on where the dispute itself (rather than the defendant) was based.17
While courts had experimented along these lines for several decades,
International Shoe revolutionized the jurisdictional landscape by
candidly introducing a dispute-specific theory.18 It began to
differentiate the concepts that Professors von Mehren and Trautman
later gave the now-familiar monikers of specific and general personal
jurisdiction.19 International Shoe dispensed with the idea that disputespecific jurisdiction turned on old metaphors of “presence”20 and
“consent.”21 Instead, when a lawsuit “arise[s] out of or [is] connected
with the [corporation’s] activities within the state,” due process allows
that state to exercise jurisdiction over the corporation.22 The analysis
thus no longer relies on old formalisms but rather on a defendant’s
contacts with the forum and the reasonableness of asserting
jurisdiction.23
Commentators believed that general jurisdiction would
diminish in importance as the Supreme Court embraced a more robust
role for specific jurisdiction.24 But the doctrine didn’t develop that way.
Despite a willingness to decide a range of specific jurisdiction cases over
the ensuing decades,25 the Court did not clearly define exactly what

15. Professor Stein calls it a “category mistake” to ask whether a corporation is physically
present in a state at the time of service of process. Stein, supra note 6, at 535.
16. See Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 972–75.
17. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 611, 613.
18. See id. at 623–25. Before International Shoe, courts experimenting with dispute-specific
jurisdiction had couched their analysis in the old nomenclature. One such legal fiction was the
idea of “implied consent.” See, e.g., Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
19. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966).
20. See 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945) (describing “presence” as a conclusion rather than a
mode of analysis); see also Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 779 (referring to the Supreme Court’s
disapproval of the “presence” test); Stein, supra note 6, at 535 (referring to “presence” analysis as
a “category mistake”); Twitchell, supra note 11, at 624 (“[International Shoe] held that the
‘presence’ formulation begged the question . . . .”).
21. See 326 U.S. at 318–19 (similarly treating “consent” in dispute-specific contexts as a
“fiction”).
22. Id. at 319.
23. See id. at 316–17.
24. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144, 1164; Twitchell, supra note 11, at
628, 676.
25. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (noting that
the “Court’s decisions have elaborated primarily on circumstances that warrant the exercise of
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kind of relationship must exist between the lawsuit and the forum in
order for specific jurisdiction to be proper.26 More significantly, the
Court placed significant constraints on its scope.27
The essential test for specific jurisdiction, as decades of civil
procedure students have learned, is whether the defendant has “certain
minimum contacts” with the forum “such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.’ ”28 This two-prong test—minimum contacts and basic fairness—
still serves as the backbone of specific jurisdiction analyses. Other
commentators have ably recounted the doctrinal permutations and
complexities that have since developed.29 For present purposes, though,
it suffices to note just some of the most prominent ways in which the
Court has cabined specific jurisdiction.
Since International Shoe, the Court’s specific jurisdiction case
law has focused almost entirely on the defendant. While the doctrine
nominally considers the possible inconvenience to a plaintiff if the
lawsuit were relocated to a different forum,30 it overwhelmingly treats
a defendant’s inconvenience as paramount in the jurisdictional
calculus. At one point, the Court asserted that one of the primary
purposes of the minimum contacts prong was to “protect[ ] the
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient
forum.”31 It has also treated inconvenience to defendants within the
fairness prong of the analysis.32 Exactly what degree of inconvenience

specific jurisdiction, particularly in cases involving ‘single or occasional acts’ occurring or having
their impact within the forum State”).
26. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 629–30, 633, 637; see also Brilmayer et al., A General
Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV. 721, 727–28.
27. See Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI . LEGAL F.
119, 130–32; Stein, supra note 6, at 542.
28. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
29. For particularly good overviews of the major cases since International Shoe, see Patrick
J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to
Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19, 56–78 (1990), and William M. Richman,
Understanding Personal Jurisdiction, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 599–637 (1993). Professor Effron also
offers a nice overview and a very useful discussion of the Court’s 2011 personal jurisdiction
decisions. See Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The Relatedness
Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 872–91 (2012).
30. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (noting
that plaintiff’s forum choice is a relevant consideration under International Shoe’s fairness prong);
Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (same).
31. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.
32. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113–14 (1987) (majority
opinion) (noting that fairness factors include consideration of “the burden on the defendant” and
that “the burden on the defendant in this case is severe”).
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presents constitutional concerns remains somewhat murky;33
nonetheless, inconvenience to the defendant remains a central feature
of the specific jurisdiction analysis.34
Perhaps the most conspicuous way in which the Court has
adopted a defendant-centric focus is through its refinement of the
minimum-contacts prong. It is not enough that the defendant simply
have a meaningful contact with the forum (for example, if the
defendant’s product causes harm in the forum state). Rather, the
contact must result from the defendant’s “purposeful availment” of the
forum’s benefits and protections.35 Thus, if a local automobile retailer
sells a car in New York, the purchaser drives the car across the country,
and the car becomes involved in an accident in Oklahoma, the retailer
is not subject to personal jurisdiction in Oklahoma.36 Why? Although
there is a meaningful contact with Oklahoma (the car sold by the
defendant caused harm there), the contact did not result from the
defendant’s purposeful association with the forum. Instead, the car
wound up in Oklahoma through the plaintiff’s “unilateral activity.”37
This insistence on the defendant’s intentional contact with the forum
proves especially vexing when a product has moved through an
extensive distribution chain. The Court continues to express skepticism
that a manufacturer, simply by placing its product into the stream of
commerce, has demonstrated sufficient purposeful contacts with states
and countries along the distribution chain.38
The test for specific jurisdiction thus has become increasingly
demanding.39 Although this modern theory of personal jurisdiction—
with its focus on contacts and reasonableness—was supposed to become

33. Compare id. at 114 (noting unconstitutional inconvenience of compelling a Japanese
manufacturer to travel to California and litigate in a foreign judicial system), with Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 483–84 (1985) (holding that inconvenience experienced by a
Michigan franchisee in traveling to Florida to try case was not “so substantial as to achieve
constitutional magnitude” (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957))).
34. Many scholars have roundly criticized this development. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer,
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 627 (2006) (arguing that
“the constitutionalization of convenience turns out to be one of the greatest flaws of personal
jurisdiction doctrine as currently conceived”); see also Borchers, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing “that
the convenience rationale is, at a minimum, severely overstated”).
35. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475; see also Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
36. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 288–91.
37. Id. at 298 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
38. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion)
(“The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the
defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.”); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,
131 S. Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (plurality opinion) (noting that placement of product into stream of
commerce does not demonstrate that defendant has “targeted the forum”).
39. See Borchers, supra note 27, at 130–32; Stein, supra note 6, at 542.
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the dominant mode of analysis, it actually created severe jurisdictional
gaps. But general jurisdiction remained alive and well. In fact, because
of the Supreme Court’s crabbed approach to specific jurisdiction,
general jurisdiction still played an outsize role, but with only limited
and vague guidance from the Court.
B. The Persistence of General Jurisdiction
International Shoe recognized the continuing salience of true
general jurisdiction, in the sense that such jurisdiction is disputeblind.40 There was widespread agreement that a corporation would be
subject to general jurisdiction at least at its “home bases”—its place of
incorporation and its principal place of business. 41 But how much
further it might extend remained unclear initially. During the next
sixty-six years, the Supreme Court decided only two general jurisdiction
cases. Because both seemed so easy on their facts, they offered only
limited guidance to lower courts.
The first, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., involved
a suit in Ohio against a foreign mining corporation.42 Although the
defendant’s mining operations were centered almost entirely in the
Philippines, those operations had ceased during the Japanese
occupation of the Philippines in World War II. The company’s president
and general manager returned to his home in Ohio and managed the
corporation’s activities from there for the remainder of the war.43 The
Supreme Court held that Ohio could exercise general jurisdiction over
the defendant.44 As scholars and courts have recognized, the case
comfortably fit into the traditional conception of general jurisdiction
because the company effectively had relocated its principal place of
business, albeit temporarily, to Ohio.45
The second case, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
Hall (“Helicol”),46 presented an easy example at the other end of the
40. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
41. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1141–42; Twitchell, supra note 11, at
633; see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 735.
42. 342 U.S. 437, 447 (1952).
43. Id. at 447–48.
44. See id. at 448.
45. See, e.g., Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 734; Todd David Peterson, The Timing of
Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 213 (2011); von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144; see also Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal
Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 566–
67 (2012) (describing Perkins as presenting “extreme facts” and noting the Supreme Court’s later
characterization that Ohio had become defendant’s “de facto principal place of business”).
46. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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spectrum. The defendant had no physical operations in Texas. Its only
contacts with the forum included sending its CEO to Texas for one
contract negotiation, purchasing goods and services from Texas,
sending personnel to Texas for occasional training, and drawing money
from a Houston bank into its own account in New York.47 Although such
contacts clearly would have been sufficient for any action arising out of
them,48 the Court had little trouble concluding that they fell far short
of the standard for general jurisdiction. Notably, the Court contrasted
the case with Perkins, but it offered no real clues about how to analyze
cases that fell into the vast expanse between Helicol and Perkins.49
In theory, the lack of guidance from the Supreme Court
regarding general jurisdiction should not have mattered that much. But
general jurisdiction retained an oddly prominent place because of the
confluence of two factors. First, as discussed above, the promise of a
broad and flexible doctrine of specific jurisdiction never came to full
fruition. Second, the Supreme Court offered only limited guidance on
the appropriate standards for general jurisdiction and indicated a basic
unwillingness to police its bounds. Lower courts largely embraced the
opportunity to give the doctrine a wide reading. Consequently, general
jurisdiction often provided a surer grounding for haling defendants into
court, and it served to fill jurisdictional gaps left by the Supreme Court’s
often hidebound approach to specific jurisdiction.50
Lower courts’ tests for general jurisdiction often were quite lax
and, even more frequently, bereft of any sound theoretical justification.
A number of courts continued to invoke the old pre–International Shoe
metaphors of “presence” and “doing business.”51 They usually insisted
on a showing of direct sales into the forum and a fairly minimal physical
presence there.52 Despite the fact that those metaphors originally had
sought to capture the corporate equivalent of an individual’s domicile,53
courts often applied such tests in a way that exposed some defendants
to general jurisdiction even when those defendants manifested none of
the “traditional indicia of such jurisdiction—a home base, an agent for

47. Id. at 416.
48. Twitchell, supra note 11, at 639–40.
49. See Helicol, 466 U.S. at 414–16.
50. Borchers, supra note 27, at 130–32; Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business with
Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. C HI. LEGAL F. 171, 196–97; see also Meier Feder, Goodyear,
“Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 680–81
(2012) (noting ubiquity of “doing business” approach to general jurisdiction).
51. Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 981–82; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 635–36.
52. See Feder, supra note 50, at 680 n.20.
53. See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
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service of process, [or] a local office.”54 In other words, the “doing
business” test encompassed far more than a corporation’s principal
place of business and could include almost any place where a
corporation engaged in regular business activities.55 As a result, the old
metaphors had strayed far from their intended goal. Moreover, their
continued vitality was perplexing in light of International Shoe’s
admonition that such metaphors were mere conclusions rather than
actual modes of analysis.56
Other courts set the bar even lower, holding that defendants
could be subject to general jurisdiction based only on a high volume of
sales in the forum (despite a lack of physical presence there).57 Such an
approach has proved especially controversial when courts assert
general jurisdiction based only on the availability of a defendant’s
website and a certain volume of Internet sales into the forum. 58
Professor Pielemeier has argued that perhaps the most frustrating
approach involved tallying the defendant’s contacts with the state and
then simply announcing whether they were sufficient to justify general
jurisdiction.59
Even courts that insisted on a higher showing—say, requiring
that the defendant have some physical presence, such as a small
office60—failed to offer a sound theoretical justification for why such a
minimal connection to the forum should make the defendant
answerable for any and every lawsuit there. General jurisdiction was
filling some of the gaps left by the Court’s specific jurisdiction case law
but in a haphazard and unpredictable way. The disjunction between the
two thus persisted. By the time the Supreme Court decided Goodyear,
general jurisdiction had become a “theoretical wasteland.”61
54. Twitchell, supra note 11, at 635.
55. See id. at 633–36.
56. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316–17 (1945); see also Pielemeier, supra
note 12, at 982.
57. See Peterson, supra note 45, at 213–14 (describing courts’ “general assumption” that
extensive direct sales could lead to general jurisdiction); Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 983
(describing this as the minority position); see also Borchers, supra note 27, at 127–29 (noting that
“no clear answer exists” whether a certain volume of direct sales can lead to general jurisdiction).
58. See, e.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1076–80 (9th Cir. 2003);
Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 509–13 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also Allan R.
Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory
Precision, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 411, 436–41 (2004) (characterizing Gator.com and Gorman as the
exceptions to the rule that courts have “resisted finding general jurisdiction based solely on
defendant’s maintenance of a web site accessible from the forum”).
59. Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 983.
60. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 634 (noting that courts were more likely to find general
jurisdiction appropriate when defendant engaged in physical activity within state borders).
61. Feder, supra note 50, at 684.
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III. “AT HOME”: CONSTRICTING THE SCOPE OF GENERAL JURISDICTION
A. Goodyear and its Aftermath
Twenty-seven years after its last decision on general
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court revisited the doctrine in Goodyear,
which concerned a bus accident in France in which two North Carolina
boys died.62 The boys’ parents sued an American corporation and three
of its foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina state court, alleging that
faulty tires caused the accident.63 Although the parent company,
Goodyear USA, did not contest jurisdiction in the North Carolina
courts, the three subsidiaries did.64 Yet again, the general jurisdiction
question seemed straightforward. As the Supreme Court noted, the
subsidiaries were “not registered to do business in North Carolina”; had
“no place of business, employees, or bank accounts in North Carolina”;
and did “not solicit business in North Carolina.”65
In one sense, the Supreme Court expeditiously corrected a
convoluted—perhaps even specious66—jurisdictional analysis by the
North Carolina courts. (The state courts had imported the stream-ofcommerce theory, which might establish specific jurisdiction over a
defendant, into the general jurisdiction analysis.67) But in a lucid
opinion by Justice Ginsburg on behalf of a unanimous Court, Goodyear
accomplished far more than mere error correction.
The opinion was a masterstroke. It cleaned up old (and
occasionally misleading) metaphors, loose language, and convoluted
opinions. It managed to reconcile the holdings of the Supreme Court’s
cases yet also convey unmistakably that the lower courts had been far
too indulgent in finding general jurisdiction. Moreover, it introduced
the phrase “at home,” which succinctly captures the essence of general
jurisdiction and became the lodestar by which lower courts should
reorient their analysis.
62. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011).
63. Id. The three subsidiaries were based in Turkey, Luxembourg, and France.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2852. The defendants’ only connection with North Carolina was the limited
distribution of some of their tires there. But none of the tires distributed in North Carolina
included the models that were on the bus in question. Id.
66. See Stein, supra note 6, at 530 (“If a first-year law student had written that answer on
my Civil Procedure final exam, I would have had a hard time giving it a passing grade.”).
67. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854–56. In the specific jurisdiction context, the stream-ofcommerce metaphor can permit courts to assert jurisdiction when a defendant’s product moves
through an extensive distribution chain and causes harm to the end consumer in the forum. To
the extent that jurisdiction is permissible, though, it extends only to lawsuits that arise directly
from the harm that the product causes in the forum. See id. at 2855–56.
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The first problem to which Goodyear attended was the
shorthand phrases that lower courts had used as the tests for specific
and general jurisdiction. As noted above, International Shoe contained
the kernel of this idea.68 Although that opinion made great strides in
many respects, it did not articulate a fully formed theory to differentiate
the two species of personal jurisdiction. 69 To fault it for not having
anticipated these nuances would be unfair, but some of its phrases
wound up having an insidious influence on the development of the case
law. When articulating the concept of general jurisdiction, for instance,
International Shoe said that general jurisdiction could be permissible
when a defendant’s “continuous corporate operations” are “so
substantial and of such a nature” as to justify jurisdiction over the
defendant regarding any lawsuit.70 By contrast, specific jurisdiction is
appropriate when a corporation’s forum activities are “continuous and
systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on.”71
Subsequent cases truncated and inverted those phrases. The
Court’s general jurisdiction analysis in Perkins, for example, asked
simply whether the defendant had engaged in “continuous and
systematic corporate activities” in the forum.72 Helicol then enshrined
the “continuous and systematic” phrase as the test for general
jurisdiction.73 Divorced from the rest of the qualifying language in
International Shoe, the “continuous and systematic” language had
created a deceptively low bar for asserting general jurisdiction.
Goodyear never explicitly called out the mischief that the shorthand
phrase had caused. But Justice Ginsburg’s opinion took pains to
reintroduce International Shoe’s contextualizing language, both for
specific and general jurisdiction.74
In reorienting the analysis, Goodyear made three important
moves. First, it identified a corporation’s principal place of business and
68. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317–18 (1945).
69. The nomenclature owes to Professors von Mehren and Trautman. See generally von
Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19 (describing specific and general jurisdiction).
70. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 317 (emphasis added). In fact, the Court went on to make clear that “continuous
and systematic” activities were not necessary in the specific jurisdiction context. Id. at 318. It was
a factual description of International Shoe’s activities in Washington. The key for specific
jurisdiction is whether the contacts, however limited, give rise to the lawsuit. See id.
72. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952). Although Perkins had
substituted the “continuous and systematic” phrase from International Shoe’s description of
specific jurisdiction for the “continuous and substantial” phrase, it is not clear that that
transposition is meaningful. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 767 n.6 (2014) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring in judgment).
73. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984); see also
Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 979–80; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 675.
74. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
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its place of incorporation as the paradigms of where general jurisdiction
would be appropriate.75 Second, it made clear that Perkins is the
“textbook case” of when general jurisdiction is permissible outside of the
paradigms.76 In so doing, Goodyear underscored that the relationship
between the defendant and the forum in Perkins was not simply
substantial but that, in fact, the forum effectively had become the
defendant’s principal place of business during World War II. 77 Finally,
the Court introduced a new phrase that grounded the general
jurisdiction inquiry—whether the defendants’ contacts with the forum
are so substantial “as to render them essentially at home” there.78 The
Court cited the “at home” phrase twice more and used it as the standard
for assessing whether the defendants were amenable to general
jurisdiction in North Carolina.79 In some ways, the “continuous and
systematic” language understandably had become a convenient
shorthand because the International Shoe phraseology was quite a
mouthful.80 The notion of “at home” expressed the same sentiment but
in a pithier, more quotable way. It is a succinct distillation that
beautifully conveys how high the bar is.
Goodyear represented a dramatic shift. Courts81 and

75. Id. at 2853–54.
76. Id. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir.
1981)).
77. See id.
78. Id. at 2851 (emphasis added).
79. See id. at 2854, 2857.
80. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (“[T]here have been instances
in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities.”).
81. See, e.g., Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2012) (describing “at home”
standard as “stringent”); Henry A. v. Willden, No. 2:10-CV-00528-RCJ, 2014 WL 1809634, at *6
(D. Nev. May 7, 2014) (“The Supreme Court recently twice clarified that the reach of general
jurisdiction is narrower than had been supposed in the lower courts for many years.”); Estate of
Thompson ex rel. Thompson v. Mission Essential Pers., LLC, No. 1:11CV547, 2013 WL 6058308,
at *5 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 2013) (construing Goodyear and stating that “the bar for determining
general jurisdiction has been raised”); see also Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, No. 11-3934-CV, 2014
WL 4629049, at *11 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2014) (recognizing that Daimler abrogated Second Circuit
precedent on general jurisdiction); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750 F.3d 221,
224–26 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (recognizing stringency of the “at home” standard and suggesting that
earlier New York precedent on general jurisdiction might no longer pass muster); Gilmore v.
Palestinian Interim Self-Gov’t Auth., No. 1-853 (GK), 2014 WL 2865538, at *4–5 (D.D.C. June 23,
2014) (suggesting that Goodyear’s articulation of “at home” standard was a significant doctrinal
shift); Meyer v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., No. 13 CIV. 3128 CM, 2014 WL 2039654, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014) (treating “at home” language in Daimler as limiting general jurisdiction
to paradigm examples).
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commentators82 overwhelmingly recognized that the Court had
contracted the scope of general jurisdiction and that significant change
was afoot. The only real question was how significant it would be.83
A relatively safe assumption was that a corporation’s physical
presence in the forum should be a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for the exercise of general jurisdiction.84 In all likelihood, that
requirement should put an end to some courts’ practice of exercising
general jurisdiction based only on regular sales, including online sales,
into the forum.85 Moreover, it is hard to imagine that a corporation with
only a minimal physical presence in the forum will be at home there.
Consequently, the “doing business” approach that many courts had
adopted—albeit with amorphous standards—probably is no longer
valid.86
Goodyear, to my mind, was always more ambitious than that, an
opinion that effectively restricted general jurisdiction to the paradigm
examples (principal place of business and place of incorporation) or
their functional equivalents (as in Perkins). Other scholars
acknowledged that this was a plausible, if not exactly ineluctable,
reading of Goodyear.87 Some scholars who were genuinely enthusiastic
about Goodyear’s constriction of general jurisdiction and the level of
clarity and coherence that it provided nonetheless resisted the idea that
it had trimmed general jurisdiction to that extent.88 Moreover, some of
those scholars noted that, despite Goodyear’s tremendous strides, the

82. See Stein, supra note 6, at 527–28 (arguing that Goodyear “cast[ ] doubt over a large body
of lower court decisions”); Feder, supra note 50, at 680; Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 989–91; see
also Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 587 (arguing that “[t]he restriction of general jurisdiction to one
or two states would effect a radical shift”).
83. See Feder, supra note 50, at 680.
84. See Stein, supra note 6, at 545.
85. See id.; Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 989–90; see also Peterson, supra note 45, at 213–
14.
86. See Feder, supra note 50, at 695 (concluding that Goodyear’s “at home” requirement
“undermines the lower court case law that has accepted . . . doing business in a state as a sufficient
basis for general jurisdiction”); see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 761 n.18 (2014)
(noting that precedent finding general jurisdiction based on “ ‘doing business’ in the
forum . . . should not attract heavy reliance today”).
87. See Pielemeier, supra note 12, at 990; see also Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 587
(recognizing but criticizing this possibility). Professor Pielemeier also notes that Justices Kennedy,
Kagan, and Sotomayor entertained this possibility during oral argument. See Pielemeier, supra
note 12, at 990. In light of Justice Sotomayor’s opinion in Daimler, though, the musings during
oral argument probably merit a grain or two of salt. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 767–71 & n.9
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing that general jurisdiction should not be limited to
place of incorporation and principal place of business).
88. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 6, at 547.
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Court still would need to clarify certain remaining questions—chief
among them the precise scope of the phrase “at home.”89
Notwithstanding the general scholarly enthusiasm for Goodyear
and the consensus that, at the very least, it had significantly
constrained general jurisdiction, skeptics remained. Some scholars
called the opinion “troubling”90 and doubted whether the Court actually
had upended so much case law.91 They suggested that a defendant’s
direct sales into a forum, even in the absence of any physical presence
there, still might warrant the exercise of general jurisdiction. 92
Furthermore, a minority of courts has clung to the idea that Goodyear
left lower court jurisprudence completely undisturbed.93 In that vein,
some courts continue to rely solely on a high volume of forum sales to
justify asserting general jurisdiction.94 And when one court decided a
question of general jurisdiction, it dismissed Goodyear—with literally
no analysis—as “not on point.”95
Although one justifiably can identify certain outstanding
questions about the precise scope of Goodyear’s edicts on general
jurisdiction, some of the skeptics’ arguments manufacture ambiguity
89. See Effron, supra note 29, at 889; Stein, supra note 6, at 545–48; see also Lea Brilmayer
& Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear
Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617, 619–20 (2012)
(noting outstanding questions and arguing that “the analytic mechanisms for deciding hard cases
remain underdeveloped”); Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 610 (posing a series of questions that
Goodyear purportedly did not resolve).
90. Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 583; see also Peterson, supra note 45, at 213 (“The problem
with . . . Goodyear is that it could be read much more broadly than the facts of this particular case
might suggest.”).
91. See Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 551 (arguing that Goodyear “achieved consensus only
because it can be read in radically different ways”); Peterson, supra note 45, at 217 (assailing
“conflicting metaphors and references” that “do not lead in any clear direction”).
92. See Hoffheimer, supra note 45, at 576; Peterson, supra note 45, at 213–14; see also Linda
J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and Comparative
Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 613 (2012) (arguing that Goodyear “is not clear” on whether
general jurisdiction requires a defendant’s physical presence in forum).
93. See, e.g., Hess v. Bumbo Int’l Trust, 954 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 n.1 (S.D. Tex. 2013)
(“Goodyear did not purport to announce new principles or change the law of personal jurisdiction;
it applied existing principles in a modern stream-of-commerce context.”); see also J.B. ex rel.
Benjamin v. Abbott Labs. Inc., 12-CV-385, 2013 WL 452807, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 6, 2013) (rejecting
the argument that “Goodyear created a ‘new standard to govern the exercise of general jurisdiction
over a corporation’ ”).
94. See, e.g., Ruben v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (E.D. Pa. 2013); Ashbury Int’l
Grp., Inc. v. Cadex Defence, Inc., No. 3:11CV00079, 2012 WL 4325183 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2012);
see also McFadden v. Fuyao N. Am. Inc., No. 10-CV-14457, 2012 WL 1230046 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12,
2012) (exercising general jurisdiction over defendant, which had no physical presence in forum,
based only on business negotiations in and regular sales into that forum).
95. Holocaust Victims of Bank Theft v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 807 F. Supp. 2d 699, 704
(N.D. Ill. 2011). But see Abelesz v. OTP Bank, 692 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing Magyar
Nemzeti Bank).
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where there is none. Perhaps this is born simply of a disagreement with
the Court’s project. No fair reading, though, can ignore the Court’s clear
intent to shift the mode of analysis and, through the “at home”
standard, dramatically restrain the more adventurous interpretations
of general jurisdiction. But the persistence of certain questions—large
and small, reasonable and unduly imaginative—necessitated another
intervention by the Court.
B. Daimler AG v. Bauman96
Daimler reaffirmed the “at home” test for general jurisdiction.
Without explicitly saying so, it also moved ever closer to the most
restrictive interpretation of that standard. And similar to Goodyear, it
saw the Court speak with a nearly unanimous voice through an opinion
by Justice Ginsburg. (Justice Sotomayor concurred in the judgment.)
Daimler involved allegations that Mercedes-Benz Argentina
(“MB Argentina”), a subsidiary of the company now known as Daimler
AG (“Daimler”), had collaborated with the Argentine government
during the “Dirty War” of 1976–1983 and perpetrated horrific human
rights abuses. The plaintiffs sued Daimler, a German corporation, in
California. 97 Because the lawsuit concerned events in Argentina,
personal jurisdiction in California was appropriate only if Daimler
could be subject to general jurisdiction there. The plaintiffs contended
that another Daimler subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
(“MBUSA”), had sufficient contacts with California to be amenable to
general jurisdiction there and that those contacts were imputable to
Daimler, MBUSA’s parent. In other words, they contended that
MBUSA was “Daimler’s agent for jurisdictional purposes.”98
The Supreme Court rejected the assertion of general jurisdiction
over Daimler on two grounds. First, it dispensed with the agency
argument in a mere three paragraphs.99 Second, and far more
interestingly, the Court held that even if the subsidiary’s California
contacts were imputable to Daimler, Daimler still would not be subject
to general jurisdiction there.100

96. 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
97. Id. at 750–51.
98. Id. at 752. The plaintiffs also alleged that Daimler itself had enough contacts with
California to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over it. The district court rejected that
argument, and the plaintiffs did not challenge that finding. See id. at 752, 758.
99. Id. at 759 (holding that subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts are imputable to parent
corporation only when subsidiary “is so dominated by the [parent] as to be its alter ego”).
100. Id. at 760.
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In some ways, Daimler was another easy case. Neither Daimler
nor MBUSA was incorporated in California, and neither maintained its
principal place of business there.101 Moreover, MBUSA’s California
sales represented only 2.4% of Daimler’s worldwide sales volume.102 But
the Court’s framing of the issue suggests that the paradigm examples
of general jurisdiction—except in the rarest cases—will be the exclusive
means of obtaining general jurisdiction over a corporation.
For starters, there no longer can be any doubt that “at home” is
the standard for assessing when general jurisdiction is appropriate. 103
The majority opinion in Daimler used the phrase eighteen times.
After the Court recounted its earlier general jurisdiction case
law, including Goodyear, it observed that “general and specific
jurisdiction have followed markedly different trajectories post–
International Shoe. Specific jurisdiction has been cut loose from
Pennoyer’s sway, but we have declined to stretch general jurisdiction
beyond limits traditionally recognized.”104 The last phrase is instructive.
In the nineteenth century, the “limits traditionally recognized” derived
from a sovereign’s authority over people and property within its
borders.105
The Court then subtly but unmistakably underscored its
conclusion with a citation to a seminal article by Professors von Mehren
and Trautman.106 In one passage cited by Daimler, they argue that “the
sole community where it is fair to require [a corporation] to litigate any
cause of action . . . is the corporate headquarters—presumably both the
place of incorporation and the principal place of business, where these
differ.”107
Daimler largely made the same point when it discussed
Goodyear as standing for the proposition that “only a limited set of
affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to allpurpose [general] jurisdiction there.”108 Immediately afterward, in
101. Id. at 761.
102. Id. at 752.
103. Cf. Peterson, supra note 45, at 215 (arguing that “it reads too much into Justice
Ginsburg’s statement [in Goodyear] to suggest that [a corporation’s ‘home’] is the only place in
which general jurisdiction may be asserted”).
104. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757–58 (emphasis added).
105. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. C HI. LEGAL
F. 141, 149–50 (arguing that, in response to the Supreme Court’s suggestion that a corporation is
subject to general jurisdiction only in its place of incorporation, states in the nineteenth century
began to force corporations wishing to do business in the state to “consent” to jurisdiction).
106. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n.9 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at
1177–79).
107. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1179.
108. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
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describing that “limited set of affiliations” for corporations, the Court
reiterated what it had said in Goodyear: “the place of incorporation and
principal place of business are paradigm bases for general
jurisdiction.”109
Of course, the mere description of paradigm examples does not
deem them to be the exclusive places where general jurisdiction is
appropriate.110 Indeed, Daimler acknowledged as much.111 At various
points throughout the opinion, though, the Court signaled how little
room there is for deviation from the paradigm examples. Daimler
fleshed out the concept of being at home in a state, making plain that a
corporation must be “comparable to a domestic enterprise in that
State.”112 Moreover, it explained that only an “exceptional case” would
justify any deviation from the paradigms and, critically, cited Perkins
as the quintessential exception to the overarching rule. 113 In Perkins,
the defendant effectively had relocated its corporate operations to
Ohio.114 The Court’s understanding long has been that Ohio had become
the defendant’s “principal, if temporary, place of business.”115 Perkins
thus set the bar exceedingly high—essentially, the functional
equivalent of a paradigm forum. This presumably is the type of
situation that Daimler envisioned as the “exceptional case” in which a
defendant’s affiliations with the forum are “comparable” to those of a
domestic company. In fact, Daimler went so far as to suggest that

109. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
110. See Peterson, supra note 45, at 215 (making such an argument about Goodyear’s
language).
111. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (“Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to
general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business;
it simply typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.”); id. at 761 n.19 (“We do not foreclose
the possibility that . . . a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of
incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render
the corporation at home in that State.”).
112. Id. at 758 n.11. Such comparability is not based on an absolute quantum of contacts with
the state. Otherwise, as Daimler argued, a large corporation could be subject to general jurisdiction
everywhere because it might have just as many contacts with a state as does a local business that
operates only in that one state. The Court argued, in contrast to Justice Sotomayor, that a
“corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.” Id. at
762 n.20; see also infra notes 132−134 and accompanying text.
113. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
114. “To the extent that the company was conducting any business during and immediately
after the Japanese occupation of the Philippines, it was doing so in Ohio.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011); see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8
(quoting Goodyear’s understanding of Perkins).
115. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780, n. 11 (1984); see also Daimler, 134
S. Ct. at 756 n.8 (noting that “Ohio could be considered ‘a surrogate for the place of incorporation
or head office’ ” (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144)).
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Perkins might have set the bar so high as to render it a one-off
situation.116
Perhaps most tellingly, when the Court actually analyzed
whether Daimler or MBUSA was at home in California, it trained on
the fact that neither company was incorporated in California and that
neither maintained its principal place of business there. 117 Full stop.
The Court offered no further discussion of other ways that the
companies might have been at home in California. In other words, in
the overwhelming majority of cases, there will be no occasion to explore
whether a Perkins-type exception might apply.
If I am right, one might query, why didn’t the Court state
directly that general jurisdiction is proper only in a paradigm forum?
First, the Court in Goodyear and Daimler took pains not to overrule any
of its precedents. Perkins thus necessitates leaving the door ever so
slightly ajar. Second, the Court probably did not want to create an
ironclad rule, lest a corporation manipulate its (technical) principal
place of business in order to gain a jurisdictional advantage.118 In a
slightly different context, the Court recognized the need for a modicum
of flexibility in defining a corporation’s principal place of business for
that very reason.119
*

*

*

Daimler thus confirmed the most ambitious reading of
Goodyear. A corporation likely is subject to general jurisdiction only in
a state where it has incorporated or maintains its principal place of
business. The Court has left open only the slimmest possibility that
general jurisdiction might be permissible in a state that is the
functional equivalent of one of those paradigm examples. While such an
exception is theoretically possible, the Court suggests that it will be the
rarest of rarities. 120 Just as first-year medical students learn not to
privilege bizarre diagnoses, lawyers and scholars would do well to heed
the same adage here: “When you hear hoofbeats, think of horses, not
zebras.”
116. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 n.8 (noting that “Perkins ‘should be regarded as a decision
on its exceptional facts, not as a significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general
jurisdiction’ ” (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144)).
117. See id. at 761.
118. See Borchers, supra note 27, at 137 (arguing for such flexibility in general jurisdiction
doctrine).
119. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 96–97 (2010) (interpreting “principal place of
business” for purposes of diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)).
120. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760, 761 n.19.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL SATURATION POINTS AND THE BOUNDS OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The last three years have witnessed a sea change in the Supreme
Court’s general jurisdiction case law. Just as remarkable as the extent
of the change is the level of consensus that the Court has achieved in
effecting it: Goodyear was unanimous, and the Daimler majority
opinion commanded eight votes. By contrast, the Court has evinced an
entrenched division on certain questions of specific jurisdiction. Most
conspicuously, it has struggled for nearly thirty years to determine
whether, and to what extent, specific jurisdiction is proper when a
defendant places a product into the stream of commerce, the product
moves through a sophisticated distribution chain, and the product then
causes harm in the forum state. The Court failed to generate a majority
opinion in 1987 when it first confronted the issue,121 and it seemed even
more fractured in 2011 when it tried again to resolve the question.122
Scholars have recognized this strange dichotomy in the Court’s
treatments of specific and general jurisdiction, a state of affairs that
reflects the entrenched notion that the two concepts operate
independently. Indeed, part of the problem in Goodyear was the North
Carolina courts’ reliance on the analytical tools of specific jurisdiction
in the general jurisdiction context. But treating the two species of
personal jurisdiction as independent misses an important
undercurrent.
This Part demonstrates that a theory lurks within the Court’s
consensus on questions of general jurisdiction, a theory that can bridge
the divide between the two species of personal jurisdiction. In severely
tightening the standards for general jurisdiction, the Court has brought
much needed theoretical cohesion to that corner of the doctrine. But
what is right with general jurisdiction today suggests what is wrong
with specific jurisdiction.
Goodyear and Daimler vindicate a distinct vision of personal
jurisdiction: courts may not exercise their adjudicative power in
arbitrary ways. But the Court’s specific jurisdiction case law has
developed layer upon layer of requirements that have little, if anything,
to do with protecting against arbitrariness. For decades, scholars have
grappled with the major questions that the specific jurisdiction
jurisprudence has raised since International Shoe, including the
121. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
122. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
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current approach’s focus on contacts and purposefulness,123 its
defendant-centric nature,124 and its elusive constitutional source. 125
Amidst the apparent doctrinal chaos, though, there is the germ of a
coherent theory. Reorienting specific jurisdiction around the
nonarbitrariness principle that underpins the new general jurisdiction
holds the possibility of fostering a more cohesive and flexible
jurisdictional regime.
A. Two Saturation Points
As I have discussed earlier, personal jurisdiction originally was
predicated on what today courts and scholars call general jurisdiction.
It depended entirely on the relationship between the defendant and the
forum, even when the lawsuit itself had no connection to the forum.126
International Shoe introduced a new dimension to the theory—the
possibility that personal jurisdiction could be predicated on the
relationship between the lawsuit and the forum.127 Although the latter
idea was not entirely novel, International Shoe marked the advent of
an approach that candidly relied on that relationship. In earlier
decades, courts had incorporated dispute-specific considerations into
their jurisdictional analyses only by way of legal fictions, such as
implied consent, that were rooted in the old territorial approach. 128
To conceptualize the two different types of relationships that
undergird personal jurisdiction analyses since International Shoe,
imagine the following basic graphic representation. (It looks rather bare
now, but as the analysis proceeds, it will become more interesting.) The
x-axis represents the quantity and quality of the defendant’s contacts
with the forum. This was the traditional dimension of personal
jurisdiction analysis. By contrast, the y-axis represents the extent of

123. See, e.g., Brilmayer & Smith, supra note 89, at 618; Spencer, supra note 34, at 624.
124. See, e.g., Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process,
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 736–37 (2012); Spencer, supra
note 34, at 624.
125. See, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s HalfBuried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 574–82 (1995); Borchers, supra note 29, at 87–101;
Perdue, supra note 124, at 733–39; Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal
Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 N W. U. L. REV. 1112, 1115–33 (1981).
126. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 614–15. But see id. at 618 (noting that through certain
dispute-specific devices, courts, in fact, “only occasionally decided disputes having absolutely no
relationship with the forum”).
127. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text; see also Twitchell, supra note 11, at 625;
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136.
128. See supra note 18; see also Twitchell, supra note 11, at 621.
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the lawsuit’s relationship to the forum, the dimension that
International Shoe and its progeny have developed.
Figure 1

1. The Saturation Point of General Jurisdiction. By definition,
general jurisdiction is dispute-blind and thus involves no connection
between the lawsuit and the forum. Accordingly, the y-value for the
outer boundary of general jurisdiction is “0”; in other words, true
general jurisdiction is some point along the x-axis. (Of course, if a
defendant is subject to general jurisdiction in a forum and there is also
some level of connection between the lawsuit and the forum, that’s fine.
But the outer boundary of general jurisdiction must fall on the x-axis.)
One place where general jurisdiction always existed was at point
“A,” the farthest right point on the x-axis. This is where a defendant has
the greatest possible connection to the forum. For an individual, it is
her domicile;129 for a corporation, the principal place of business or the
place of incorporation.
129. Individuals also may be subject to general jurisdiction in a forum based on personal
service of process there—so-called transient or “tag” jurisdiction—even when the individual has
only a minimal connection to the forum. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
Numerous commentators have criticized the rule’s continuing endurance. See generally, e.g.,
Martin H. Redish, Tradition, Fairness, and Personal Jurisdiction: Due Process and Constitutional
Theory After Burnham v. Superior Court, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 675 (1991); Allan R. Stein, Burnham
and the Death of Theory in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 597 (1991); Mary
Twitchell, Burnham and Constitutionally Permissible Levels of Harm, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 659 (1991).
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Before Goodyear, the expansive approaches that lower courts
had taken regarding general jurisdiction located that boundary well to
the right of the origin on the graph (point “O”) but also well to the left
of point “A.” As I have described above, some courts held that general
jurisdiction was appropriate based on a relatively minimal connection
between the defendant and the forum, such as a certain volume of sales
in the forum. It’s a guestimate, but call this point “B.” Other courts
insisted on a higher showing—a more continuous relationship with the
forum and some sort of physical presence, perhaps even a branch office.
Call this point “C.” Figuring out where to locate that outer boundary—
whether at “B” or “C” or somewhere in between—did not correspond to
any well-developed theory of general jurisdiction.130
In Goodyear and Daimler, the Supreme Court located the outer
boundary of general jurisdiction at “A.” This is what I refer to as the
saturation point—the point at which it is impossible for the defendant
to have more significant contacts with any other forum. My formulation
of the saturation point allows for different states to assert general
jurisdiction over an entity—for instance, where the corporation
maintains its principal place of business and also where it has
incorporated. Both states are places where the corporation is “at home,”
albeit in different ways. In some respects, these two paradigm forums
are incommensurable. It is difficult to say that a corporation is more at
home in one than in the other. But one can say that the corporation does
not have more significant contacts anywhere else.131
This formulation of the saturation point also accounts for the
slight leeway that Daimler still allows for a case like Perkins, one in
which general jurisdiction is appropriate in the functional equivalent of
Count me among those who regard transient jurisdiction as an anachronism that is inconsistent
with modern approaches to jurisdiction, including the theory developed here, and should remain
the stuff of truly terrible movies. In that vein, never, ever see SERVING SARA (Paramount Pictures
2002).
130. See Feder, supra note 50, at 684 (calling general jurisdiction a “theoretical wasteland”).
131. In many ways this is an attempt to discern the corporate equivalent of an individual’s
domicile. That concept will include a corporation’s principal place of business, which, while often
readily discernible, sometimes presents a tricky question. For purposes of the diversity jurisdiction
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2012), the Supreme Court has created a bright-line rule: a
corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve center,” which in almost every instance will
be the corporation’s headquarters. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). In the
personal jurisdiction context, the inquiry into a corporation’s principal place of business is probably
more flexible even though, in most cases, it also will point to the “nerve center.” Moreover, unlike
in the context of § 1332, it is possible—if highly unlikely (and slightly oxymoronic)—for a
corporation to have more than one principal place of business for purposes of personal jurisdiction.
The chief candidate for this idea is probably the Boeing Company, which in 2001 moved its
headquarters to Chicago, Illinois, but still maintains extensive operations in Seattle, Washington.
I am skeptical whether Boeing is still subject to general jurisdiction in Washington, but I
acknowledge that Boeing presents an anomalously close call.
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a paradigm forum. In Perkins, the lawsuit commenced when the
defendant was directing corporate operations from its temporary
principal place of business in Ohio. Consequently, at that moment in
time, the defendant was not more at home anywhere else.
Moreover, this understanding of the saturation point suggests
that identifying where a corporation is at home depends on more than
an analysis of the total quantum of contacts that the defendant has with
the forum.132 Even if a corporation has deep and significant contacts
with a particular place, the relevant question remains whether the
defendant has more significant contacts elsewhere. Such an approach
captures the unique relationship between a defendant and the place (or
limited number of places) where it truly is at home. In the wake of
Goodyear, some commentators advocated this approach,133 which the
Daimler majority clearly—and, to my mind, correctly—adopted.134
For decades, the idea of shrinking general jurisdiction to the
paradigm examples seemed little more than an academic pipe dream. 135
The last four years, though, have seen just such a momentous shift,
which actually might lead the way to a more coherent understanding of
how personal jurisdiction, writ large, should operate.
2. The Saturation Point of Specific Jurisdiction. As the Court has
confined general jurisdiction to the saturation point along the x-axis,
Goodyear and Daimler raise the intriguing possibility of a second
saturation point, one along the y-axis. Courts and scholars long had
been aware that point “A” on the graph was one possible boundary of
general jurisdiction, even if most believed that the boundary should lie
somewhere to the left of “A.” But scholars and American courts have not
yet explored the possibility of a saturation point of specific jurisdiction.
The idea behind a saturation point along the y-axis is that there
is a point at which the connection between a lawsuit and the forum is
so tight that a particular defendant actually does not need to have any
connection to the forum. To borrow a phrase, when the lawsuit itself is
“at home” in the forum, a state may entertain that lawsuit. In exercising

132. Cf. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 767 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
judgment) (arguing that general jurisdiction turns on “the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state
contacts, not the relative magnitude of those contacts in comparison to the defendant’s contact s
with other States”); Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 742 (arguing that courts “should not treat
defendants as less amenable to suit merely because they carry on more substantial business in
other states”).
133. See Feder, supra note 50, at 694; Stein, supra note 6, at 537–38.
134. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20.
135. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 656–57; Twitchell, supra note 11, at 676; von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 19, at 1144, 1179. But see Twitchell, supra note 50, at 171–72 (expressing a
“change of heart” and suggesting a more expansive approach to general jurisdiction).
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jurisdiction, the state does not act arbitrarily, notwithstanding the
defendant’s limited or nonexistent relationship to the state.
This saturation point is more theoretical than real. In fact,
imagining such a case is almost impossible. If a lawsuit is inextricably
connected to the forum, any given defendant is likely to have some
connection—however tenuous, unintentional, or insubstantial—to the
forum. For this reason, the saturation point, identified as point “D” on
Figure 1, probably does not actually touch the y-axis, even though it
moves as close as possible to the axis.136
There actually is no need to stretch one’s imagination to find a
real or convincing case, though. The concept of a saturation point along
the y-axis is more of a thought experiment. But the idea inheres in the
very concept of specific jurisdiction. Scholars who fleshed out the theory
of specific jurisdiction—including its provenance and its purpose—
implicitly recognized that it does not depend on any relationship
between the defendant and the forum. Instead, specific jurisdiction, in
its purest form, depends only on a connection between the lawsuit and
the forum.137
This notion derives in part from one of the principal insights of
International Shoe and its progeny, which focused on the
reasonableness of asserting specific jurisdiction.138 International Shoe
itself had no occasion to explore the outer limits of specific jurisdiction.
The defendant had a significant affiliation with the forum,139 and the
connection between the lawsuit and the forum was also tight.140 Thus,
in Figure 1, International Shoe probably falls somewhere around point
“E.” Nonetheless, the case reflected a clear conceptual shift away from
136. Perhaps the situation that comes closest to this concept is when a plaintiff brings a
lawsuit that is truly at home in the forum but mistakenly sues the wrong party, which has no
connection to the forum. Today, such a defendant could move to dismiss the claim for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Under the theory developed here, the
defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction but, instead, could bring an early motion to
dispose of the claim on the merits. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (motion for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted); FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (motion for summary judgment). I am
grateful to Heather Elliott for suggesting this example.
137. See Twitchell, supra note 11, at 627 (“Under [its] original definition[ ], . . . specific
jurisdiction was based on the relationship between the forum and the dispute being litigated.”);
see also von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 19, at 1136 (“[A]ffiliations between the forum and
the underlying controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate.”).
138. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317, 320 (1945) (noting reasonableness
of assertion of specific jurisdiction); see also, e.g., McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–
23 (1957) (noting that the centrality of events in California made California a reasonable forum).
139. See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313–14 (noting that defendant employed salesmen and
regularly engaged in business in forum).
140. See id. at 311–12 (noting substantive claim for unpaid unemployment taxes incurred in,
and owed to the government of, the forum).
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the idea that courts should have to pigeonhole all assertions of personal
jurisdiction into the old territorial framework that looked solely at the
relationship between the defendant and the forum. Instead, jurisdiction
could be reasonable when the lawsuit arose in the forum.
The entire concept of the y-axis suggests a saturation point, even
though the Court thus far has been reluctant to recognize it. In the
years since International Shoe, the Court’s specific jurisdiction
jurisprudence has grown increasingly restrictive.141 Contrary to my
hypothesis above, the Court has repeatedly insisted that a defendant
always must demonstrate some level of connectedness to the forum 142
and that the defendant’s contacts with the forum must be purposeful
rather than merely fortuitous.143 Moreover, the question of what exactly
counts as a purposeful affiliation with a forum has been a source of
great consternation and has divided the Court for years. 144 In other
words, while the theory of specific jurisdiction—and a concern for the
connection between a lawsuit and the forum—suggests a saturation
point, the current jurisprudence has not embraced the full breadth of
the theory.
European courts probably have come closest to realizing the
notion of a saturation point along the y-axis. Under the Brussels I
Regulation,145 personal jurisdiction in the European Union focuses in
large part on the connection between the underlying lawsuit and the
forum.146 For example, under Article 5(3) of Brussels I, specific
jurisdiction147 is appropriate in torts cases “where the harmful event
occurred or may occur.” This provision is unconcerned with whether the
defendant has intentionally directed or targeted its activities toward
the forum;148 instead, it looks primarily to the locus of the lawsuit.
Similarly, Article 6(2) permits a court to exercise jurisdiction over thirdparty defendants who are connected to the litigation but not necessarily
141. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 27, at 130.
142. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980).
143. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787–88 (2011); WorldWide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–98.
144. The stream-of-commerce cases offer the most vivid illustration of the conundrum. See
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780; Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
145. Council Regulation 44/2001, on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1 (“Brussels I”).
146. See Ralf Michaels, Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT ’L L. 1003, 1050 (2006)
(“[E]ach of the [Brussels I] provisions on specific jurisdiction is justified by the close connection
between the dispute and the court called upon for its resolution.”); see also Willibald Posch,
Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or Other Alternatives: The Effects of Jurisdictional
Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 363, 368–69 (2004).
147. In European civil procedure parlance, “special jurisdiction.” See, e.g., Brussels I, supra
note 145, art. 5.
148. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297–98 (insisting on purposeful affiliation).
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the forum itself. Thus, when a French company sued its various French
insurers in French court, the defendants were able to join a Spanish
insurer as a third-party defendant, even though the Spanish insurer
otherwise had no connection to France. The indemnification proceeding
was centered in France, and jurisdiction, therefore, was appropriate
over all potentially liable insurers, including the Spanish defendant.149
Although the European approach comes closest to what I
envision, it does not exactly correspond to the notion of a saturation
point. For example, the provision regarding third-party joinder does not
insist that the original proceeding be in the forum where the lawsuit is
most at home. Instead, the plaintiff has latitude to choose a forum as
long as that choice “does not amount to an abuse”150 or reflect a bare
desire to subject the defendant to jurisdiction in a foreign court. 151
Moreover, the European Court of Justice has insisted that the thirdparty action must still have some connection to the original proceedings
before the forum court. 152 In other words, the saturation point of specific
jurisdiction along the y-axis, as I have conceived it, is probably more
demanding than Brussels I in insisting on the best and tightest
connection between the lawsuit and the forum. And because the
saturation point, as a theoretical matter, is concerned only with that
relationship, it does not formally insist on any connection between the
defendant and the forum.
B. The Germ of a Theory
By situating the outer boundary of general jurisdiction at one
saturation point, the Court rationalized the case law regarding that
species of personal jurisdiction. It also tapped into a coherent theory
that can provide a way out of the personal jurisdiction morass.
The two saturation points that I have described represent the
constitutional boundaries at two extremes. These points are instructive

149. Case C-77/04, Groupement d’intérêt économique Réunion européenne v. Zurich España,
Société pyrénéenne de transit d’automobiles (Soptrans), 2005 E.C.R. I-4509, I-4534 (“Soptrans”).
The European Court of Justice found that there was “a sufficient connection between the original
proceedings,” i.e., the French company’s lawsuit against its French insurers, “and the third-party
proceedings” against the Spanish insurer. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27, 36.
150. Id. ¶ 36.
151. See Brussels I, supra note 145, art. 6(2) (authorizing jurisdiction over third-party
defendants as long as plaintiff did not choose original forum “solely with the object of removing
[the defendant] from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in his case”).
152. See Michaels, supra note 146, at 1050 (citing Soptrans, 2005 E.C.R. I-4509, ¶36) (“[T]he
Court . . . restricts the jurisdiction of [Brussels I] for third-party proceedings to cases in which
there is a ‘sufficient connection between the original proceedings to support the conclusion that
the choice of forum does not amount to an abuse.’ ”).
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precisely because they reveal when a court may exercise personal
jurisdiction even in the absence of one of the relationships. Put another
way, the saturation points demonstrate exactly why the relationships
captured by the different axes should be independently meaningful. At
the same time, the saturation points are truly exceptional. Through
their exceptionalism, they reveal why the modern approach to personal
jurisdiction typically insists that a court should have some connection,
however minimal, to both the lawsuit and the particular defendant.
Consider first the relationship represented by the x-axis—that
of the defendant with the forum. Locating the boundary of general
jurisdiction at the saturation point captures an essential notion about
legitimate state power. To avoid exercising power arbitrarily, a forum
usually must have some relationship to both the lawsuit and the
defendant. Therefore, in most situations, a state acts arbitrarily when
it exercises power over a defendant regarding a case that has no
connection to the forum. The one exception—and thus the one
circumstance in which such exercise of power is not arbitrary—is when
the defendant is truly at home in the state.
The Court in Daimler recognized that whether a defendant is at
home in the forum does not depend simply on the magnitude of a
defendant’s contacts with the state. That aspect of the analysis is
critical and correct. For ease of analysis, imagine a natural person—
say, a Silicon Valley tech magnate billionaire whose domicile is in
California but who maintains a vacation home in Montana. Such a
person might own more property in Montana and invest more in the
Montana economy than most Montanans. Why should that billionaire
not be subject to general jurisdiction in Montana? To my mind, the
answer turns on notions of consent and submission.153
In a meaningful sense, natural persons choose their domicile. It
is the sovereign to which they owe a certain fidelity and to which they
have submitted for certain regulatory purposes. For example, the state
of people’s domicile has the power to tax their income based solely on
their residency there (even if most people don’t exactly celebrate that
fact).154 That state also has the power to determine when driver’s
licenses expire and what people have to do to renew them. And,
critically, it is the community in which people vote and choose the
leaders who will create the rules that govern their everyday lives. While
the California billionaire might pay property taxes in Montana and
otherwise establish ties with the state, he is not truly at home there, in
153. See Stein, supra note 6, at 547.
154. See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm’n, 286 U.S. 276, 279 (1932) (“[D]omicile in itself
establishes a basis for taxation.”).
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the sense of having consented to be a member of the community for all
purposes, including voting and being subject to myriad regulations.
Admittedly, the Californian has not literally consented to pay taxes,
serve on a jury, or be sued in any particular instance. But he has
actually chosen California as his home as well as the bundle of rights
and responsibilities that attend that choice.155
Although the notion of consent is somewhat ethereal, it
expresses why the billionaire is amenable to personal jurisdiction
regarding any lawsuit in California but not in Montana. That idea of
being at home in the forum is what distinguishes California’s ability to
assert general jurisdiction and thus makes such an exercise of power
nonarbitrary.
The same concept holds true with respect to the relationship
between the lawsuit and the forum. Usually a court would act
arbitrarily if it claimed jurisdiction over a defendant who had no
connection with the forum. But an exception to the usual rule applies
when the relationship between a lawsuit and the forum is so strong that
no other state could claim a more significant connection to the lawsuit.
In such cases—at the saturation points—the exercise of state power
becomes nonarbitrary. At those points, a state can overcome the
presumption that it should have a connection to both the lawsuit and
the defendant.
Other scholars have recognized the nonarbitrariness principle
that undergirds personal jurisdiction.156 In fact, it encapsulates the
essence of what due process protects: a defendant’s interest in not being
subject to arbitrary assertions of power. Professor Spencer has argued
persuasively that the prohibition against arbitrariness explains why
true general jurisdiction is permissible only at what I call the saturation
point along the x-axis.157 While critical, that is only half the battle. The
other saturation point identifies the converse boundary, and only by
identifying both points can an analysis reveal the full range of options
between them.
Of course, points “A” and “D” in Figure 1 are not the only
instances in which personal jurisdiction is permissible. But the
saturation points essentially bookend the analysis. In so doing, they

155. As noted above, the enduring concept of transient jurisdiction is inconsistent with this
vision of how general jurisdiction should operate with respect to natural persons. See supra note
129.
156. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 634, 636; see also Borchers, supra note 29, at 90 (arguing
that state assertions of personal jurisdiction need survive only rational basis review); Borchers,
supra note 125, at 577–79 (same).
157. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 656.
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give content to the nonarbitrariness principle that ultimately is the
touchstone of personal jurisdiction analysis.
One facet of nonarbitrariness is an underlying concern about
state sovereignty.158 The Supreme Court has vacillated over the years
about whether and to what extent state sovereignty figures into the
personal jurisdiction calculus. 159 Although many scholars have argued
that such sovereignty concerns are vestiges of an outmoded way of
thinking,160 recent commentary has emphasized the subtle but
important role that sovereignty still plays.161
The idea is part intuition, part political theory. Imagine, for
example, a New York defendant who lives in northern Manhattan.
Without traffic, the Superior Court in Hackensack, New Jersey, is a tenor fifteen-minute drive just across the George Washington Bridge from
the defendant’s home.162 By contrast, the state courthouse in Brooklyn,
New York—not just in the defendant’s home state, but in his home
city!—is twice as far away. The intuition is that state boundaries still
matter, even when a New Jersey court is more convenient than a
particular courthouse in New York City. That intuition in turn captures
the theoretical point about how someone is a member of a polity that
chooses its leaders and organizes its judicial system. Consequently,
state boundaries do not simply serve as a proxy for convenience but rest
on fundamental notions about the definition of political and judicial
power.163
Sovereignty thus remains deeply embedded in notions about
whether a court acts arbitrarily or nonarbitrarily. But despite the
constitutive role that it plays in defining judicial power, it does very
158. See id. at 639.
159. Compare, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
(invoking interstate federalism as part of personal jurisdiction analysis), and J. McIntyre Mach.,
Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2789 (2011) (plurality opinion) (same), with Ins. Corp. of Ir. v.
Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U. S. 694, 702 (1982) (describing personal jurisdiction as
a protection of individual liberty rather than of state sovereignty), and Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon
Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 584 (1999) (same).
160. See, e.g., Robert H. Abrams & Paul R. Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for
the Control of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 MINN. L. REV. 75, 75–87 (1984); Daan Braveman,
Interstate Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533, 540–54 (1982); Redish,
supra note 125, at 1113–15, 1120–21.
161. See Feder, supra note 50, at 687–88; Perdue, supra note 124, at 739; Stein, supra note 6,
at 536–37, 542–43.
162. Assuming, of course, that “traffic studies” aren’t impeding progress over the bridge.
163. Not everyone will share this intuition. Professor Redish, for example, argues that
personal jurisdiction should turn exclusively on questions of fairness and convenience. See Redish,
supra note 125, at 1137–42. But a theory of personal jurisdiction that completely ignores the
relevance of state boundaries must have some explanation for why state courts and perhaps even
states themselves continue to exist as anything other than convenient (and sometimes terribly
inconvenient) administrative units.
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little analytical work in answering specific questions. State sovereignty
does not meaningfully contribute to an analysis of, for example,
whether a state may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
whose product harms a forum resident. As Professor Perdue has
explained, sovereignty “is simply the label we apply to whatever judicial
authority is granted to the states. . . . [It] is what is left at the end of
the analysis, rather than the starting point.”164
State sovereignty helps explain why the personal jurisdiction
analysis depends on the two relationships expressed by the axes in
Figure 1. In that vital sense, sovereignty is a constitutive element of the
nonarbitrariness principle. It means that contrary to the suggestions of
some scholars, courts at least are asking the right overarching
questions about the relationship between the forum and the defendant
and the relationship between the forum and the lawsuit. The
importance of those relationships reveals why personal jurisdiction is
not simply a doctrine of convenience. At the same time, sovereignty does
not specify exactly where the outer boundaries of personal jurisdiction
should lie. As I have argued, the notion of the saturation points makes
progress toward answering the latter question by fleshing out the
nonarbitrariness principle. The following section turns to the question
of where else the exercise of judicial power is appropriate.
C. The Bounds of Personal Jurisdiction
1. Abandoning Thresholds. Personal jurisdiction obviously can
exist at places other than the two saturation points. In fact, there is a
vast middle ground between them where the exercise of jurisdiction is
permissible. Since International Shoe, though, the Court’s
jurisprudence has treated personal jurisdiction as a binary proposition
based on certain thresholds; that is, a defendant may qualify for general
jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction.
At present, the case law relies on these thresholds and, in turn,
creates the jurisdictional lacunae discussed in Part II. With respect to
general jurisdiction, once a defendant has amassed enough contacts
with a forum, she has crossed a threshold and is amenable to
jurisdiction in that particular state regarding any claim. The precise
threshold had remained somewhat mysterious until Daimler. For ease
of graphic representation, though, assume an older vision of general
jurisdiction in which the threshold was lower than it is today. The
vertical line at point “X” in Figure 2 below represents that threshold.

164. Perdue, supra note 124, at 739.
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Everything to the right of the line is an area in which general
jurisdiction is permissible.
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, has required two
thresholds. First, it insists on a certain level of “minimum contacts”
between the defendant and the forum,165 a much lower threshold than
the connection necessary for general jurisdiction. This is the vertical
line at point “Y.” Second, specific jurisdiction also has required a fairly
tight connection between the lawsuit and the forum. The Supreme
Court’s formulation over the years has required that the lawsuit “aris[e]
out of or relate[ ] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”166 Those
are actually quite different standards, as lower courts have recognized
over the years.167 The precise level of connectedness does not matter for
purposes of the present analysis. Instead, the point is that the Supreme
Court and lower courts typically have treated the required nexus as a
threshold. Although it might vary in accordance with different
formulations, I have located this threshold at point “Z.” Consequently,
current jurisprudence permits specific jurisdiction in the area to the
right of the line at “Y” and above the line at “Z.”168

165. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
166. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).
167. See O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 318–20 (3d Cir. 2007) (exploring
different levels of connectedness between lawsuit and forum necessary for specific jurisdiction);
see also, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996) (noting that the First,
Second, and Eighth Circuits follow a stringent “proximate cause” test); Shute v. Carnival Cruise
Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385–86 (9th Cir. 1990), rev’d on other grounds, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (requiring
“but-for” causation); Third Nat’l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Grp. Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th
Cir. 1989) (requiring “substantial connection”).
168. Figure 2 is based on a diagram suggested by Professor Richman. See William M.
Richman, Part I—Casad’s Jurisdiction in Civil Actions; Part II—A Sliding Scale to Supplement
the Distinction Between General and Specific Jurisdiction, 72 C ALIF. L. REV. 1328, 1341 (1984)
(book review). Although his diagram accurately depicts the Court’s current jurisprudence in most
respects, Professor Richman does not take account of the fact that the Court has not countenanced
the exercise of jurisdiction in the area to the left of the line at point “Y.”
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Figure 2

One of the principal conclusions from this Article is that,
contrary to the current case law, the outer boundary of personal
jurisdiction is not dichotomous. Instead, it exists along a continuum
between the two saturation points that I have described. Thirty years
ago, Justice Brennan rejected the idea that personal jurisdiction is
rigidly binary,169 and other scholars have explored the idea of a sliding
scale.170 Professor Richman has noted: “As the extent and importance
of defendant’s forum contacts increase, a weaker connection between
the claim and the defendant’s contacts should be permissible; as the
extent and importance of defendant’s forum contacts decrease, a
stronger connection between the claim and defendant’s contacts should
be required.”171
Despite offering a very useful conceptualization of a sliding
scale, Professor Richman and others remained tethered to the idea of
thresholds. Their concern focused on marginal cases that didn’t quite
qualify for specific or general jurisdiction, represented by the no-man’s
169. See Helicol, 466 U.S. at 425–28 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that while plaintiffs’
cause of action did not arise out of defendant’s forum contacts, it was significantly related to those
contacts).
170. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests
Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1, 34–38 (1984); Richman, supra note 29, at 615–16;
Richman, supra note 168, at 1338–45.
171. Richman, supra note 29, at 615.
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land in Figure 2.172 In other words, they sought to bridge the widening
gap between specific and general jurisdiction as the Court had
developed those concepts. 173 Moreover, Professor Richman’s idea of a
sliding scale between the current notions of specific and general
jurisdiction would still lead to the conclusion that a defendant is not
amenable to jurisdiction in a state with which she has not established
a sufficient degree of purposeful contact. In fact, he viewed the sliding
scale as opening the jurisdictional door to “only a small fraction” of the
cases in which jurisdiction is presently impermissible.174
As discussed more fully below, the nonarbitrariness principle
suggests a continuum that permits jurisdiction in far more instances
than would the current case law or even Professor Richman’s sliding
scale. Reorienting personal jurisdiction around the notion of
nonarbitrariness suggests that the Constitution probably permits
nearly every attempt to exercise specific jurisdiction that the Supreme
Court has considered since International Shoe.
The better view of the outer limits of personal jurisdiction is a
true continuum between the saturation points. A conceptualization of
personal jurisdiction that relies on thresholds and then seeks to fill
resulting gaps does not correspond with a robust theory of how
sovereignty and nonarbitrariness actually define the boundary of
permissible jurisdiction. The saturation points and the continuum
between them do just that, and in a way that abandons any need to
define thresholds. Not only does this approach offer a more theoretically
satisfying notion of personal jurisdiction, but on a practical level, it also
relieves courts of the need to define exactly where those thresholds for
specific jurisdiction are. As alluded to above, such questions have vexed
courts for decades. 175
2. The True Continuum. The remaining question, then, is what
path the continuum traces between the saturation points. Although one
could imagine various shapes, in all likelihood the curve representing
the outer boundary of personal jurisdiction is a severely concave curve.
A court may assert personal jurisdiction at all points along the curve
and to its right, but jurisdiction is impermissible in the relatively small

172. This, in fact, is the zone that Professor Richman represents in his diagram. See Richman,
supra note 168, at 1341.
173. See id. at 1345 (arguing that sliding scale should “supplement[ ]” existing conceptions of
personal jurisdiction); see also Borchers, supra note 27, at 138 (“[W]e need to build a bridge
between general and specific jurisdiction.”); Lewis, supra note 170, at 34 (“Although the Court has
not subscribed expressly to blending claim-related and nonclaim-related contacts, its decisions
certainly do not foreclose that approach.”).
174. Richman, supra note 168, at 1344 n.62.
175. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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region to the left of the curve. Figure 3 adds this curve to Figure 1,
which sketched the two basic relationships and identified where certain
cases might fall. This vision of how personal jurisdiction should operate
contrasts markedly with the current case law, as represented in Figure
2.
Figure 3

This is not a precise mathematical representation but rather is
conceptual. The basic idea is that although the saturation points
require an incredibly tight connection between the defendant and the
forum when there is no relationship between the lawsuit and the forum
(and vice versa), the standard becomes much more lax once both
relationships are present to at least some degree. This approach
corresponds with the nonarbitrariness principle that long has been at
the heart of constitutional due process. Once a forum has some
connection to both the defendant and the lawsuit—even if those
connections are minimal—there is little risk that the forum will act
arbitrarily if it exercises personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
In fact, the starting point of the modern approach to personal
jurisdiction usually assumes that both relationships should be present.
When they are, the Constitution almost always authorizes a court to
exercise jurisdiction. The converse is also true: when one of the
relationships is absent, the Constitution usually forbids jurisdiction.
For those reasons, a court’s exercise of jurisdiction based only on the
existence of one relationship will be an exception to the overarching

4 - Trammell_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

538

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

3/11/2015 7:19 PM

[Vol. 68:2:501

rule, one which is justified only when that single relationship is so tight
as to reach the saturation point. The severely concave slope of the curve
thus derives from the nonarbitrariness principle.176 Admittedly, this
approach reorients the personal jurisdiction doctrine, but it is more
faithful to the underlying tenets of the procedural guarantees that the
Due Process Clauses embody. Many scholars have argued that the
current personal jurisdiction doctrine more closely resembles a
substantive due process analysis, as it presently focuses on “the fairness
of the underlying result, rather than with the mechanism used to get
there.”177 But the constitutional boundaries of a court’s power to hale a
defendant into court more logically should protect procedural fairness—
the means by which a court compels a defendant’s appearance. Those
questions remain antecedent to concerns about substantive fairness,
which arise only at a later stage in the litigation.
The Supreme
Court
has demonstrated what
the
nonarbitrariness approach to personal jurisdiction might look like in
practice. It would rely, in nearly every respect, on the standards by
which the Court assesses the propriety of a state’s choice-of-law
decision. For choice-of-law purposes, the Court has held that a
particular state’s substantive law may govern a dispute as long as the
dispute has “a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts”
with the state, “such that choice of [that state’s] law is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair.”178 In that context, the nonarbitrariness
approach accords significant deference to a state’s choice of a particular
body of substantive law. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
has proved equally deferential to the manner in which one state applies
176. See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974) (“The touchstone of due process is
protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.” (citing Dent v. West Virginia,
129 U.S. 114, 123 (1889))); see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (noting that
procedural due process includes right “to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 (1950) (noting that procedural due process includes right to notice).
177. David S. Welkowitz, Beyond Burger King: The Federal Interest in Personal Jurisdiction,
56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1987); see also, e.g., Borchers, supra note 29, at 90 n.469; Stephen
Goldstein, Federalism and Substantive Due Process: A Comparative and Historical Perspective on
International Shoe and Its Progeny, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 976–87 (1995); Wendy Collins
Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction and Pennoyer
Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 508–10 (1987); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Liberty,
Substantive Due Process, and Personal Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 572–77 (2007).
178. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion) (emphasis
added); see also id. at 326 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“It may be assumed that a choiceof-law decision would violate the Due Process Clause if it were totally arbitrary or if it were
fundamentally unfair to either litigant.”) (emphasis added); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 814–23 (1985) (reiterating Allstate standard but holding that Kansas substantive
law could not govern when ninety-nine percent of leases and ninety-seven percent of plaintiffs had
no connection to Kansas).
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a sister state’s substantive law.179 An analogy to the constitutional
standards governing choice-of-law decisions thus suggests how personal
jurisdiction should operate.
To recognize that the Court in many respects has already
created the blueprint for a nonarbitrariness principle is not to overlook
a jurisprudential oddity. When it comes to a state’s decision about
which substantive law to apply to a dispute, the current constitutional
standards are notoriously undemanding—that is, subject only to review
for arbitrariness. But on the question of whether the state can exercise
personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the standards are much more
exacting. Justice Black noted this anomaly in Hanson v. Denckla,180 in
which he argued that Florida substantive law could govern the dispute
despite the majority’s holding that Florida could not exercise personal
jurisdiction over a Delaware defendant.181 For many years scholars
have argued that, if anything, the approaches to personal jurisdiction
and choice-of-law are backwards. A court’s power to subject a defendant
to particular substantive rules arguably merits greater scrutiny than a
court’s power to hale that defendant into court.182 Some scholars have
advocated a more robust and stringent test in the choice-of-law
realm,183 while others have suggested that both issues—personal
jurisdiction and choice-of-law—should be subject to the same
deferential standard.184 Either way, commentators largely have
reached consensus that the standards governing personal jurisdiction
should not be more stringent than those that apply to choice-of-law
decisions.
I hesitate to wade too deeply into the choice-of-law realm or
critique its nuances here. In fact, the utility of applying the
nonarbitrariness principle in the jurisdictional context does not depend
on whether the same test should continue to govern choice-of-law
179. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1988):
To constitute a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause,
it is not enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather, our
cases make plain that the misconstruction must contradict law of the other State that
is clearly established and that has been brought to the court’s attention.
180. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
181. See id. at 258–59 (Black, J., dissenting); see also id. at 254 n.27 (majority opinion)
(reserving judgment on whether Florida substantive law could apply).
182. See James Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 879–
80 (1980); Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 88
(1978); see also Brilmayer et al., supra note 26, at 782 (arguing that a court’s legislative
jurisdiction—the power to apply substantive law—is narrower than a court’s adjudicative
jurisdiction).
183. See, e.g., Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1237, 1251–66 (2011).
184. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 658–60.
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questions. But the basic intuition underlying the Court’s deferential
approach regarding the selection of substantive law seems especially
apt in the personal jurisdiction realm. As Professor Spencer has argued,
the procedural due process concerns in both contexts protect against
arbitrariness.185 While he correctly resists a “facile” equation of the two
analyses, he notes that they often will point in the same direction. 186
Figure 3 reflects the idea that an appropriate focus on due process
concerns about arbitrariness will countenance most assertions of
personal jurisdiction when the forum has some connection, even when
quite limited, with both the defendant and the underlying dispute.187
D. The Way Forward
I have argued that locating true general jurisdiction at the
saturation point along the x-axis in Figures 1 and 3 holds the promise
of resolving a host of other problems. In concluding this Article, I offer
three essential lessons that courts can glean from the developments
described here.
First, the saturation points elucidate how certain modes of
analysis can ensnarl the jurisdictional calculus. For example, when the
Supreme Court in Nicastro188 held that the defendant was not amenable
to specific jurisdiction in New Jersey, where the defendant’s product
harmed the plaintiff, the plurality drew on language and analyses that
define one saturation point. Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion spoke
of ascertaining whether the defendant had “submitted” or “consented”
to jurisdiction in the forum.189 At one point, the opinion formulated the
specific jurisdiction inquiry as training on whether the defendant had
“manifest[ed] an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign.”190
Justice Ginsburg chastised the plurality for trying to
reinvigorate notions of “consent” that International Shoe and its
progeny had discarded as legal fictions.191 That’s mostly right. Insofar
as she was speaking about the fact that consent is largely irrelevant to
specific jurisdiction analyses, she was absolutely correct (and, in
fairness, the sole question in Nicastro pertained to specific
185. Admittedly, the choice of substantive law might also implicate substantive fairness
concerns.
186. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 658–60.
187. See Borchers, supra note 29, at 89–90 (arguing for deferential approach to state
assertions of personal jurisdiction based on nonarbitrariness principle).
188. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
189. See, e.g., id. at 2788–89 (plurality opinion).
190. Id. at 2788.
191. See id. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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jurisdiction). 192 Nevertheless, consent is still a meaningful concept
when identifying the saturation point at which true general jurisdiction
exists. I have argued that point “A” in Figures 1 and 3, in locating the
place where a person and an entity are truly at home, relies on what
Professor Stein has called “bona fide consent.”193 At that point, natural
persons and entities have truly chosen their home. But at any other
point along the continuum, notions of consent are indeed fictional, as
Justice Ginsburg argued. The plurality’s mistake, then, was importing
an analysis that applies only at the saturation point for general
jurisdiction into the rest of the jurisdictional analysis.
The concepts that define the two saturation points are
appropriately strict. They ferret out the tightest possible connection
between the forum and the defendant, on one hand, and the forum and
the lawsuit, on the other hand. But the strictness of the analysis in
identifying those two points—“A” and “D” in Figure 3—belies the
tremendous leeway that exists almost everywhere else along the
continuum.
The second lesson, a corollary of the first, is that despite the
strictness of the saturation points, constitutional due process is much
more forgiving when the forum has a connection to both the defendant
and the lawsuit. Such latitude suggests that the Constitution probably
approves almost every exercise of specific jurisdiction that the Supreme
Court has deemed to be problematic.
To illustrate how the nonarbitrariness principle liberalizes
personal jurisdiction, consider the recent Nicastro case in which the
defendant had taken steps to market an industrial shearing machine
throughout the United States. One such machine moved through the
usual distribution chain, wound up in New Jersey, and seriously
injured the plaintiff there.194 The defendant had a mild but relevant
connection to New Jersey because the defendant sought to serve the
entire United States, including New Jersey, through the usual flow of
its products through the distribution chain. Moreover, the connection
between the lawsuit itself and New Jersey was quite strong.
Accordingly, the nonarbitrariness principle makes the stream-ofcommerce cases like Nicastro relatively easy from a constitutional
perspective.

192. A defendant may actually consent to personal jurisdiction once a lawsuit has begun or in
advance (through a forum selection clause). But the difficult specific jurisdiction inquiries do not
involve just express consent. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy cast those questions in terms of
implied consent or submission. See id. at 2787–88 (plurality opinion).
193. See Stein, supra note 6, at 547; see also supra note 153 and accompanying text.
194. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
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The same is true in World-Wide Volkswagen. Although the local
New York retailer had conducted no business in Oklahoma, the retailer
sold the automobile that ultimately caused significant harm in
Oklahoma.195 Admittedly, the connection between the defendant and
the forum is even weaker than in Nicastro because the New York
retailer had not intended to serve the Oklahoma market. But that
connection is probably enough, particularly because the epicenter of the
litigation was in Oklahoma—the accident took place there, the
plaintiffs were hospitalized there, and nearly all of the relevant
evidence was there.
Or consider the Helicol case, which involved a lawsuit in Texas
against a Colombian defendant regarding a helicopter crash in Peru.
Although the Court did not directly consider whether specific
jurisdiction was appropriate,196 evaluating the case from that angle is
instructive. In passing, the Court expressed skepticism whether specific
jurisdiction would have been appropriate,197 and Professor Richman has
articulated a similar ambivalence about whether his proposed sliding
scale would allow jurisdiction. 198 Under a nonarbitrariness approach,
though, jurisdiction is clearly proper. There was a nontrivial connection
between the defendant and the Texas forum as well as between the
lawsuit and the forum. The defendant had purchased eighty percent of
its helicopter fleet from Texas and sent many of its pilots to Texas for
training,199 including the pilot whose alleged negligence caused the
crash in Peru.200 Even without the fairly tight causal connections, the
extent of both relationships suggests that specific jurisdiction over the
defendant in Texas would have been far from arbitrary.
Other commentators have reached the same basic conclusion:
nearly every personal jurisdiction case that the Supreme Court has
considered since International Shoe probably complies with the
nonarbitrariness principle. 201 But the concept of saturation points
195. See 444 U.S. 286, 288–89 (1980).
196. The Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s regular contacts with Texas came
nowhere close to satisfying the standards of general jurisdiction. Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416–18 (1984). Moreover, the Court did not directly consider
the question of specific jurisdiction because the parties had conceded that the defendant’s contacts
with Texas did not give rise to the claim. Id. at 415–16 & n.10.
197. See id.; see also id. at 418 n.12.
198. See Richman, supra note 168, at 1345 n.63.
199. Helicol, 466 U.S. at 411.
200. Id. at 426 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
201. See Borchers, supra note 125, at 577–78 (arguing that assertions of specific jurisdiction
that the Supreme Court invalidated were not, in fact, arbitrary and thus should have passed
constitutional muster); see also James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial
Jurisdiction: Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 255 (2004) (arguing that under
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grounds that conclusion in a coherent theory of personal jurisdiction
that explains the proper scope of both general and specific jurisdiction.
Moreover, this approach also points the way toward a true specific
jurisdiction—the idea that jurisdiction can be proper based solely on a
tight connection between the forum and the lawsuit itself.
The third lesson might be somewhat surprising in light of the
second. Because of the incredibly lax constitutional standard for
personal jurisdiction between the saturation points, the Supreme Court
acts appropriately when it crafts common-law limitations on courts’
power.202 If I and others are correct in our assessment of the limited
restraint that the Constitution offers, 203 there is the potential for courts
to exercise personal jurisdiction in inconvenient204 and intuitively
(though not unconstitutionally) unfair ways. That which is lawful is not
always beneficial or edifying.205 Or, as Justice Stevens has put the point
in the choice-of-law context, the Constitution gives states plenty of room
to adopt “unsound” policies.206
At the federal level, litigants and courts already have several
tools at their disposal to ameliorate some of these problems. These
include venue provisions, 207 the power to transfer cases to a more
convenient forum,208 and the ability to dismiss cases based on the
common-law doctrine of forum non conveniens.209 While these and
similar tools at the state level address many concerns about
convenience and general fairness to the litigants, new problems arise
frequently. For instance, in the Internet context, does a virtual
company expose itself to personal jurisdiction everywhere in the United
States unless it takes affirmative steps to withdraw from certain states?
Does it matter whether the company is a large multinational
corporation or a small mom-and-pop operation? And what happens
an arbitrariness standard “every assertion of state court jurisdiction considered by the Supreme
Court since it introduced the minimum contacts test in International Shoe Co. v. Washington
would easily pass muster”).
202. Professor Borchers, who has embraced my second conclusion, draws a diametrically
opposed lesson from the laxness of the constitutional standards that govern specific jurisdiction.
He views the Constitution’s permissiveness as an invitation for states to experiment. See Borchers,
supra note 29, at 103–04.
203. See Borchers, supra note 125, at 577 (calling the Constitution a “weak check” on personal
jurisdiction); see also Weinstein, supra note 201, at 255.
204. See Spencer, supra note 34, at 632 (arguing that inconvenience hardly ever rises to the
level of unconstitutionality).
205. See 1 Corinthians 10:23–24.
206. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 331–32 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment).
207. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1390, 1391 (2012).
208. See id. §§ 1404, 1406.
209. See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429–30 (2007).
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when a defendant has engaged in intangible activity (say, operating a
website) and allegedly caused intangible harm (say, infringing a
protected trademark)?210
In an ideal world, Congress would act to address novel concerns,
as it has done in important respects through venue and transfer
provisions. Within the loose personal jurisdiction doctrine described
above, Congress has the power to provide more rigorous protections. 211
That is probably desirable. But if Congress does not act, the appropriate
solution is not simply to allow states to exercise personal jurisdiction
subject only to a demonstrably weak constitutional check.212
Like Congress, the Supreme Court also has the power to
articulate prudential limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
Even after Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins famously declared that
“[t]here is no federal general common law,”213 federal courts still retain
the power to craft a more modest, specialized form of common law.214
This new federal common law is narrower in scope (as it governs only
unique areas of federal concern)215 and broader in effect (as it now
creates law that also binds state courts).216 Professor Monaghan argues
that one species of the new federal common law is a “constitutional

210. A coauthor and I attempt to address these questions and craft a concrete approach in
light of the theory developed here. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal
Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,” 100 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
211. Several scholars have argued that Congress has direct power to control state courts’
jurisdiction over persons. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 29, at 104–05 (locating such power in both
the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Commerce Clause); Weinstein, supra note 201, at 279
n.408 (locating such power in the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Other scholars have suggested
that Congress might have only an indirect power to regulate at least some state assertions of
personal jurisdiction. Because Congress may regulate how states accord full faith and credit to one
another’s judicial proceedings, see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, if a state court in State A fails to comply
with congressional directives, Congress can prevent federal courts and the courts of sister states
from recognizing any judgment rendered by State A’s courts. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, How
Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1326 n.153, 1347 (2014).
212. Cf. Borchers, supra note 29, at 103 (arguing that the Supreme Court should get “out of
the business of regulating personal jurisdiction” and “throw the matter back to the states”).
213. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (emphasis added).
214. For example, on the same day that the Supreme Court decided Erie, it created federal
common law, coincidentally in a decision also authored by Justice Brandeis. See Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
215. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 383, 405 (1964).
216. See id.; Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 10 (1975); see also Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
HARV. L. REV. 881, 897 (1986) (“Although at one point there was some doubt, it is now established
that a federal common law rule, once made, has precisely the same force and effect as any other
federal rule. It is binding on state court judges through the supremacy clause.”). By contrast, preErie federal common law created law only for the federal courts. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1268 (1996).
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common law,” which is inspired, but not compelled, by the
Constitution.217 In his formulation, two hallmarks characterize
constitutional common law. First, it is interstitial. Usually it articulates
a remedial or procedural rule to operationalize a given constitutional
provision that, without guidance from Congress or the Supreme Court,
would remain ineffectual.218 Second, because the specific common-law
rule is not actually constitutionally compelled, it is subject to revision
by Congress.219
In a creative and thorough examination of the source and nature
of personal jurisdiction rules, Professor Weinstein builds on Professor
Monaghan’s insights and argues that nearly all of the limits on personal
jurisdiction qualify as constitutional common law.220 Since the early
years of the republic, the bounds of personal jurisdiction have usually
derived from such common law rules.221 In crafting those rules then and
now, the Supreme Court gives effect to the structural concerns
embedded in the Full Faith and Credit Clause as well as Congress’s
implementing legislation.222 Critically, though, whenever the Court
exercises this power to promote a perceived need for national
uniformity,223 those common-law rules are always subject to
congressional tweaking.224 In these situations, “[t]he Court, in effect,
opens a dialogue with Congress.”225
All of this suggests that the actual constitutional standards
governing personal jurisdiction are quite lax and that additional
restrictions are often desirable. But the space for prudential or quasiconstitutional innovation concerns only the area between the two
saturation points, as the saturation points are already subject to
rigorous standards. These are situations in which a court hales a
foreign defendant into a forum where that defendant is not at home.
Precisely because out-of-staters might be subject to the various whims

217. Monaghan, supra note 216, at 9, 28, 36. For example, the classic Miranda warning is a
prophylactic rule that seeks to effectuate the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Fifth Amendment does not
actually compel this rule, which is simply one way to operationalize the overarching privilege. See
Monaghan, supra note 216, at 20.
218. See Monaghan, supra note 216, at 18–20.
219. See id. at 27–30.
220. See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 173–74, 255, 265.
221. See id. at 175–81; see also Borchers, supra note 29, at 23 (noting that, until the end of
the nineteenth century, federal common law defined the contours of personal jurisdiction in federal
court).
222. See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 283–90.
223. See Monaghan, supra note 216, at 12–13.
224. See Weinstein, supra note 201, at 278, 288.
225. Monaghan, supra note 216, at 29.
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of state courts, the need for nationwide uniformity and predictability is
paramount. Experimentation by the states, especially if they are
inclined to exploit the tremendous latitude the Constitution gives them
to bring foreign defendants into their courts, seems undesirable.226 In
many instances, Congress is the best institution to adopt such
policies.227 But if Congress does not or cannot respond expeditiously, 228
the Court has the power, which it has always exercised, to craft
prudential rules when the Constitution otherwise would allow states to
exercise their discretion haphazardly.
My argument suggests that while the saturation points are
constitutionally compelled, including the newly tightened parameters
of general jurisdiction, the vast majority of the other limitations on
personal jurisdiction are probably prudential. An evaluation of the
wisdom of those prudential limitations is beyond the purview of this
Article. Nonetheless, a proper understanding of which limits are
constitutional and which are prudential will enable a more productive
conversation between the Supreme Court and Congress. The Court acts
appropriately when it seeks to address modern problems and craft
sensible limits on the bounds of courts’ power over litigants. But the
Court should make clear which of those doctrines are prudential and
thus subject to reformation by the political branches.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the Supreme Court’s virtual unanimity on the question
of general jurisdiction lies the hope of a coherent and unified theory of
personal jurisdiction, one rooted in procedural due process and the
notion of nonarbitrariness. The Court has identified the saturation
point at which general jurisdiction is appropriate—where the
connection between the defendant and the forum is as tight as possible.
It also has implied the existence of another saturation point. The two
points together help define the outer constitutional limits of personal
jurisdiction. Although the boundary that traces its way between the two
saturation points suggests a lax constitutional regulation of personal
jurisdiction in most instances, I have argued that that laxness also
reveals possibilities for innovation. As seemingly hidebound

226. See Borchers, supra note 27, at 122 (noting prevalence of state long-arm statutes that
expressly—or through judicial construction—extend as far as the Constitution allows).
227. Weinstein, supra note 201, at 282.
228. See Monaghan, supra note 216, at 28.
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constitutional notions become suppler, Congress and the Supreme
Court can work cooperatively and creatively to fashion sensible
prudential limits on courts’ adjudicative powers.

